The 13th High-Level Meeting (RAN) between Spain and Morocco, held this past December 4 in Madrid, closed with the signing of fourteen cooperation agreements and a joint declaration that consolidates the new phase of the bilateral relationship, according to the PSOE. However, what was designed as a diplomatic normalization exercise has become a focal point of geostrategic tension and an evident source of fracture within the Spanish government itself. The opacity of the summit, the reiteration of the controversial shift on the Western Sahara, and the persistent threat of Algerian gas have dominated the subsequent analysis.
The summit reaffirmed the solidity of the economic partnership. Spain remains Morocco’s principal trading partner since 2012, with exchanges surpassing €22.6 billion in 2024. The fourteen agreements signed seek to expand this relationship beyond security and migration, encompassing areas as strategic as water management, the digitalization of taxation, food security, and seismic cooperation in the Strait of Gibraltar.
Notably the Cooperation Agreement in the Field of Sport, which lays the groundwork for coordination in the joint organization of the 2030 FIFA World Cup, alongside Portugal. This pact is not only symbolic, but entails a deep coordination of infrastructures and logistics, intertwining the interests of both countries even more. Moreover, the Memorandum of Understanding on Digital Tax Cooperation seeks to modernize Moroccan tax administration, facilitating information exchange and strengthening the legality of growing bilateral trade, a pillar essential for long-term investment.
The axis of these agreements underscores Madrid’s attempt to build a relationship “more modern, global and transversal” with Rabat. However, the apparent ease in technical and economic terms sharply contrasts with the rigidity and secrecy in the political management of the most thorny issues.
The turning point and the main reason for the controversy again lie in the issue of Western Sahara. Spain formally reaffirmed its position adopted in 2022, describing the 2007 Moroccan autonomy initiative as “the most serious, credible and realistic basis for resolving this dispute”. This language, which avoids mentioning the UN-endorsed referendum on self-determination historically defended by the UN, is the diplomatic victory that Morocco has sought and achieved at this RAN.
The most significant is the commitment to coordination of positions that Spain and Morocco have agreed to maintain “within the framework of the United Nations process, particularly within the Security Council”. Given that Spain is a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council until 2027, this commitment is interpreted by many analysts as an effective alignment with the Moroccan thesis in the international decision-making body. This step, which for Rabat represents a major advance, occurs despite reports, not officially confirmed by the Moncloa, of an attempt by Morocco to press for a swap of recognition (Moroccan sovereignty over Western Sahara in exchange for recognition of Spanish sovereignty over the Canary Islands), a maneuver rejected by the Spanish government which limited itself to the UN resolutions framework. The Moncloa, mindful of internal and external sensitivities, opted for maximum discretion, closing the meeting without the traditional joint press conference for questions, which has fed criticism of opacity on a matter of such geostrategic significance.
The political discomfort generated by this summit was palpable at the internal level, exposing a deep fissure within the governing coalition. The response of the minority partner, Sumar, was unusual and forceful: its ministers were absent from the family photo and from the main RAN events. This decision was not a mere protocol excuse, but a political display of its absolute rejection of reiterating support for the Moroccan stance on the Sahara.
From Sumar’s space, the government’s position was labeled a “historic error” and a “violation of international law.” Prominent figures of the party insisted on the need for Spain to reverse the 2022 shift, arguing that the current stance amounts to a de facto alignment that sacrifices international legality and the historical responsibility of Spain to the Sahrawi people. For Sumar, this diplomacy is harming the country’s image and creating unnecessary flashpoints, urging the Government to resume an “active neutrality” that promotes a fair solution based on the right to self-determination.
The absence of ministers was the clearest political gesture that the government’s foreign policy, especially on this point, does not enjoy unanimous backing from its coalition partners. In this sense, it was the leader of Sumar and Vice President of the Government, Yolanda Díaz, who was the most critical on this matter, in a video in which she appears reading some Sahrawi verses, stating that from her party they are not willing to support the loss of a single centimeter of Sahrawi land in favor of Morocco.
Meanwhile, the main opposition party, the People’s Party (PP), measured its criticisms cautiously, seeking to point to the government’s management without undermining the need for a “state policy” in the relationship with Morocco. The PP focused its offensive on the lack of transparency surrounding the summit. They demanded that the government detail the concessions obtained by Spain in exchange for its decisive support for the Moroccan autonomy plan, lamenting the absence of a press briefing that would allow journalists to ask about the real implications of the agreements and the Joint Declaration.
The Popular Party criticized the unilateral way in which the Government handled the 2022 shift and this new ratification, accusing the Government of unnecessarily damaging historical relations with Algeria and of yielding to Rabat’s pressures without obtaining sufficient guarantees for national interests. The opposition has repeatedly insisted on the existence of an “asymmetric bilateral relationship”, where concessions seem to tilt systematically in favor of Morocco. The PP demanded firmer defense of Spanish sovereignty and territorial integrity, including clarity on Ceuta and Melilla, and a more balanced management that does not jeopardize relations with key partners for such a divisive stance.
The ratification of support for the Moroccan plan at the RAN has once again strained Algeria to the maximum, the main defender of the Polisario Front and a fundamental supplier of natural gas for Spain’s energy security. The persistent diplomatic friction since 2022 has not translated into a total and immediate cut of supply, which would violate contracts that would harm Sonatrach’s reputation, but into a strategic reconfiguration of the energy map to Spain’s detriment.
Since the political shift, Algeria punished Spain with the closing of the Magreb-Europa Gas Pipeline (GME), forcing Madrid to rely exclusively on the Medgaz (Algeria–Almería) pipeline and to seek alternatives. This situation has driven Spain to significantly increase its dependence on LNG, mainly sourced from the United States. While LNG dependence diversifies sources, it also raises costs and makes supply more vulnerable to global market fluctuations.
Beyond the GME, the Algerian strategy has focused on prioritizing other European partners, notably Italy, expanding the Transmed gas pipeline and sending a clear signal about the availability and price of gas arriving in Spain. The diplomatic tension, though not breaking the contracts, implies a constant risk of interruption or, more likely, pressure through contract revisions that raise price and the political cost of gas, weakening Spain’s competitive position as the gateway for Algerian gas into Europe.
